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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-----------------------------------------
IN RE THE MATTER 
OF 
NELDA BOYER 
Case No. 16853 
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF STATE OF UTAH 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an order of the Second 
·District Court in Weber County, finding the appellant to 
be incapacitated and appointing a guardian over her person. 
Appellant challenges the constitutionality of the guardian-
ship provisions of the Utah Uniform Probate Code. The state 
as Amicus Curiae, herein defends the constitutionality of the 
Utah Statutes. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Second Judicial District Court of Weber County, 
the Honorable Judge Calvin Gould, presiding, after a jury trial, 
found that appellant was an incapacitated person pursuant to 
Section 75-1-201, Utah Code Annotated, and in need of a guardian. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Appellants' sister, Susie Rice, was appointed .as guardian and is 
presently serving in that capacity. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The State of Utah, as Amicus Curiae, seeks this court's 
declaration that the guardianship provisions of the Utah Uniform 
Probate Code are constitutional. 
In the alternative, the state would suggest that this 
case might appropriately be remanded if this court finds that 
the judge below did not correctly apply the guardianship statutes 
in this particular case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The state as Amicus Curiae is not an advocate for either 
of the parties in this case. It is not the state's purpose to 
argue or discuss the particular facts of this case. The court 
should note, however, that due to lack of resources of the 
guardian's family, no responsive brief has been or will be filed. 
Therefore, the court's analysis of the specific facts of this 
case and the lower court's application of the statute to those 
facts will of necessity be assisted only by Appellant's Brief and 
the record itself. 
-2-
/, 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
The interest of the State of Utah as Amicus curiae in 
this case is to defend the validity and constitutionality of 
the guardianship provisions of the Utah Uniform Probate Code. 
This brief is directed only to that issue and does not address 
points raised.in Appelant's Brief which do not challenge the 
statute itself. _Specifically, Point VII of Appellant's Brief, 
which discusses the expert witness testimony which was 
accepted by the judge below, is not addressed or responded 
to in the state's brief. Neither does the state argue the 
appropriateness or correctness of the lower court's application 
of the guardianship statutes in this particular case. However, 
it should be pointed out that should this court find a mis-
application of the statute by the lower court, it can avoid 
any finding as to the constitutionality of the statute simply 
by remanding with directions to make a different application 
of the statute.-
This brief addresses appellant's arguments concerning 
the constitutionality of the involuntary guardianship provisions 
of the Utah Uniform Probate Code, Title 75, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 as amended, which was substantially adopted by the Utah 
-3-
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State Legislature in 1975. Appellant contends that the guardian-
ship provisions allow the state to deprive an individual of 
important fundamental constitutional rights without sufficient 
-due process and equal protection safeguards. 
In any necessary guardianship there may be deprivation 
of personal liberties. However, the basic issue in this case 
should not be whether any deprivation of personal rights because 
of incapacity is ever warranted, but rather whether an individual 
who has been deprived of some such rig~ts due to incapacity 
has been afforded sufficient due process and equal protection 
safeguards. The adoption of the Utah Uniform Probate Code was 
due in part to the recognition by the state legislature of the 
potential infringement of civil rights by involuntary guardianships;: 
and the need for procedural and substantive protections. In order 
to comply with due process and equal protection requirements 
necessitated because of the possible deprivation of fundamental 
rights, the involuntary appointment of a guardian must be based 
upon a compelling state interest, be the alternative least 
restrictive of basic rights, afford sufficient procedural due 
process, and be imposed under a sufficiently definitive statute. 
By adoption of the Uniform Probate Code, Utah has ensured these 
safeguards. 
-4-
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POINT I 
THE UTAH GUARDIANSHIP STATUTES DO NOT 
UNCONSTITUTICNALLY DEPRIVE THE WARD OF 
FUNDAMENTAL CIVIL RIGHTS. 
By imposing involuntary guardianship upon an adult 
person, the courts may deprive the incapacitated individual 
of some rights enjoyed by others generally. Basically, the 
guardian has the _same control and custody of the incapacitated 
person that a parent has of his unemancipated minor child. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 75-5-312. Concededly, an appoint-
rnent of a guardian due to the incapacity of the ward, can 
restrict an individual from exercising some fundamental civil 
rights -- control over property, Section 75-5-312(b), choice of 
place of abode, Section 75-5-312(a), personal choice of medical 
care and treatment, Section 75-5-312(c). Other freedoms which 
may be limited are the right to marry, sue, contract, and 
hold a license, Mental Health and Human Rights, Report of the· 
Presidents' Commission on Mental Health, Ariz. L.R. 20:49-174, 
77, 1978. As these are basic rights protected by the Constitu-
tion, the state must have a strong interest in limiting their 
exercise by some persons. 
A. INVOLUNTARY GUARDIANSHIPS, WHEN ORDERED 
PURSUANT TO UTAH LAW, ARE JUSTIFIED BY 
IMPORTANT AND COMPELLING STATE INTERESTS. 
To prevent the detrimental physical and financial 
consequences of incapacity has been unanimously determined by 
-5-
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every state legislature to be an important state interest 
sufficient to warrant involuntary guardianship. (For a list 
of current guardianship statutes, see Mitchell, Involuntary 
Guardianship, Southern California Law Review, July 1979, Vol. 
52, No. 5, footnote 35.) Though the several states do not 
have identical procedures for appointing guardians, and though 
some may violate requirements of due process of law, the 
unanimity does demonstrate the recognized need and importance 
of involuntary guardians and conservators when warranted by 
manifest disability. So compelling in .fact is the interest of 
the state in providing necessary guardianships that the Presidents' 
Commission on Mental Heal th did not even question the legitimacy ro: 
of the imposition of guardianship if due process was ensured. ~ 
Mental Health and Human Rights, Arizona Law Review, 20:49-174, j 
19 7 8. "' 
The Utah statutes themselves express the reasons why ~ 
the state has such a great interest in the warranted appointment ~ 
of guardians. The "incapacitated person," according to Section ~.: 
7 5-1-201, is one who "lacks sufficient understanding or capacity co1 
to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning his person.:~ 
Thus, Section 75-5-304 states that "appointment is necessary and 
desirable as a means of providing continuing care and supervision ~: 
of the person of the incapacitated person." Section 75-5-312 state!i 
that another reason for appointment of a guardian is to provide 
for the comfort, maintenance, training, and education of the 
-6-
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ward. Section 75-5-401 states that an appointment of a con-
servator (the "guardian" of the ward's estate rather than the 
ward's person) is to protect the estate of the ward from waste 
or improvident dissipation, not only for the care of the ward but 
also,when necessary or desirable,to provide for the care of those 
entitled to be supported by the ward. Section 75-5-402(c) recognizes 
also a need to protect creditors of the ward by protective pro-
ceedings. 
Another unexpressed, though logical, reason for in-
voluntary guardianship is to protect the state and society from 
undue welfare and tax burdens which would result from permitting 
the person to continue making decisions regarding himself and 
his estate which he is unquestionably incapable of making. In 
short, the justification of involuntary guardianship is needed 
to ensure protection of the incapacitated person, his dependants, 
and the state from the detrimental and legitimately avoidable 
consequences of decisions which futilely risk physical and 
financial ruin. 
Guardianship is a consequence of living in a civilized 
society. Autonomy, even if it can be considered a fundamental 
right, must bend,just as do guarded rights such as speech and 
religion, when conduct or actions drop below a tolerable floor 
-7-
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into behavior that is destructive of social good, familial 
integrity and security, and one's own physical and financial 
state. There would seem to be no question that one who attempts 
suicide is mentally aberrant and in need of help. Why then 
would not the state have an interest in preventing eventual 
physical or financial suicide when ones mental perspective 
becomes so distorted that.he can no longer make responsible 
decisions concerning himself and his affairs? The conclusion 
is that the state does have a compelling interest in appointing 
guardians when warranted, which interest can only be questioned 
when the appointment is a result of a violation of due process 
or equal protection. (See Points II, III, and IV, supra, for 
a discussion of due process protections afforded by the Utah 
statutes.) 
B. THERE IS NO NEED TO FIND A SUSPECT 
CLASS AS STRICT SCRUTINY IS ALREADY 
APPLIED TO THE GUARDIANSHIP PRO-
CEEDINGS. 
Petitioners argue that imposition of involuntary 
guardianship creates a "suspect class" that invites strict 
scrutiny of the Utah Uniform Probate Code provisions on 
guardianship. Since it is conceded that involuntary guardian-
ship may result in some restriction of basic rights, which 
would invite the same standard of scrutiny, it is not necessary 
to. argue whether involuntary wards are a suspect class. However, 
-8-
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it is important to note that the United States Supreme Court 
has in recent years been slow to expand the classes considered 
suspect. It has retreated in extending "suspectness" to several 
classes, including illegitimates. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 
762 (1977). The court has instead relied on newer equal pro-
tection analysis, which is a reasonably related test with bite. 
This test requires "at a minimum, that a statutory classification 
bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose." 
Id. at 766. 
Because the Utah involuntary guardianship statute can 
pass even the strict scrutiny test, which requires a compelling 
·state interest and least restrictive alternatives, there is no 
question that the Utah statute is not rationally related to a 
legitimate state purpose. 
-9-
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POINT II 
THE UTAH UNIFORM PROBATE CODE PROVIDES 
FOR AND REQUIRES THE MOST APPROPRIATE 
GUARDIANSHIP OR ORDER WHICH LEAST 
RESTRICTS THE EXERCISE OF FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS. 
Because of the possible deprivation of rights which 
might result from an involuntary guardianship, due process not 
only requires a compelling state interest, but also that any 
infringements upon such rights be necessary and minimally 
restrictive. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). The 
Utah Uniform Probate Code recognizes that incapacity can arise 
from a number of causes and in variable degrees. (Section 
75-1-201.) Consequently, any statute providing for involuntary 
guardianship must be sufficiently flexible to allow the 
courts to tailor the appointment or appropriate order to meet 
the circumstances of each case and yet handle the spectrum 
of cases ranging from minor to severe disability. 
The Utah involuntary guardianship statutes are 
constructed so as to meet both of these requirements. In 
regard to flexibility, the Utah statutes permit innumberable 
alternatives, limited only be ingenuity itself. The Utah 
court can appoint either a guardian or conservator or both 
(See sections 75-5-303, 75-5-401, 75-5-410, and Editorial 
Board Comment to 75-5-312.) Alternatively, the court can 
issue appropriate orders in lieu of guardianship, section 
-10-
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75-5-304, or enlarge or limit the statutorily defined powers 
of the conservator, Section 75-5-426, or guardian, Section 
75-5-312. Section 75-5-408 lists permissible alternative 
court orders as a result of protective proceedings, and 
Section 75-5-409 even authorizes protective contracts, trusts, 
or arrangments of single transactions. In view of these 
statutes it is apparent that any manner of guardianship 
or limited guardianship can be fashioned and, perhaps more 
importantly, avoided, since Section 75-5-304 permits appropriate 
orders that could entail powers of attorney, trusts, provision 
of home care or day care services, or whatever services are 
available and appropriate. 
The Utah statutes also bind the court to assess and 
use the alternatives which least infringe upon the rights of 
the indivicual. Sections 75-5-304 and 75-5-401 state that 
the court must be satisfied that appointment (or any other 
alternative which the court can order) is "necessary or desir-
able .... " The Utah statute therefore does not compel the 
violation of basic rights as do statutes such as were addressed 
in Shelton v. Tucker, supra, which arbitrarily violated the 
rights of association by requiring full disclosure of associations. 
Rather, the Utah guardianship statutes flexibly permit the tailoring 
of appropriate orders or appointments and encourage the courts to 
restrict the incapacitated person's rights only if necessary or 
-11-
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desirable. As the courts are bound to afford due process and 
equal protection, which include the minimal restriction of 
basic rights, the interpretation of the word "desirable" must 
be limited by the bounds of constitutional law. Furthermore, 
those appointments or orders which are "necessary" are only those 
which are minimally required to provide the incapacitated with 
proper and effective care,and consequently result in guardian-
ships which are least restrictive of the individual's rights. 
It is also necessary to determine what is required 
by the "least restrictive alternative" doctrine. Most of 
the case law regarding this issue concerns civil commitments, 
but the underlying concern of safeguarding due process makes 
the courts' analys~s in commitment cases appropriate in this 
case. In the case of Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. 
Cir. 1966), the court stated: "Deprivation of liberty solely 
because of dangers to the ill persons themselves should not 
go beyond what is necessary for their protection." Id. at 660. 
To satisfy this obligation, the court held that commiting courts 
have a duty to explore alternatives, which the state has the 
burden of proposing, and to use earnest effort to provide care 
reasonably suited to the individual's needs. Lake was cited in 
Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969), which 
concerned due process requirements after commitment. That 
-12-
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court's standard of review to determine whether a decision 
conformed with the least restrictive alternative was whether 
\ 
the court "made a permissible and reasonable decision in view 
of the relevant information and within the broad range of dis-
cretion." (419 F.2d at 621). Perhaps the most lenient standard 
that has been held to comport with the least restrictive 
alternative requirement was expressed in Welsch v. Likins, 
373 F.Supp. 487 (Minn. 1974), which stated that due process 
requires state officials to make "good faith attempts to 
place such persons in settings that will be suitable and 
appropriate to their mental and physical conditions while 
least restrictive of their liberties." In light of these 
cases it is apparent that the least restrictive alternative 
requirement is not as strict as at first may be presumed. 
(One explanation of this might be that expressed in Lake 
that proceedings of care and treatment are not strictly 
adversary proceedings. Guardianship, a vestige of parens 
patriae, is still considered as conferring a benefit,'which 
historically did not require due process, rather than a taking 
of a right.) The requirement seems to require only that the 
court earnestly consider alternatives and choose that which 
reasonably suits the individual's needs of proper and effective 
care and least restricts fundamental rights. The Utah standard 
requiring that a guardianship appointment or order be that which 
-13-
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is most "necessary or desirable" among the statutory alternatives, 
ranging from dismissal of the petition to· full guardianship, fully 
complies with and exceeds the requirements of the least restrictive 
alternative doctrine. 
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POINT III 
THE UTAH UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 
PROVIDES SUFFICIENT PROCEDURAL 
SAFEGUARDS AND STANDARD OF PROOF 
TO ENSURE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL 
PROTECTION OF THE LAW IN PROCEEDINGS 
FOR INVOLUNTARY GUARDIANSHIP. 
Another requirement of due process is sufficient 
procedural safeguards when the deprivation of basic rights is 
possible. The factors in determining what is sufficient 
were set forth in Mathews v .. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), 
which states: 
[D]ue process generally requires 
consideration of three factors: 
first, the private interest that 
will be affected by the official 
action; second, the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures 
used, and the probable value, if 
any, of additional or substitute 
safegu.ards; and finally, the 
Government's interest, including 
the function involved and the 
fiscal and administrative burdens 
that the additional or substitute 
procedural requirements would entail. 
424 U.S. at 335. 
The Presidents Commission on Mental Heal th, Mental 
Health and Human Rights, Arizona Law Review 20:49-174, 176, 1978, 
listed by recommendation what due process required of guardian-
ship proceedings: 
4. Guardianship 
Recommendation 1. 
(a) State guardianship laws should 
be revised to provide: (1) increased 
-15-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
procedural protections including, 
but not limited to, written and 
oral notice, the right to be pre-
sent at proceedings, appointment 
of counsel and a clear and con-
vincing evidence standard as the 
burden of proof; a comprehensive 
evaluation of functional abilities 
conducted by trained personnel; 
and a judicial hearing which 
employs those procedural standards 
used in civil actions in the courts 
of general jurisdiction of any 
given State; (2) a definition of 
incompetency which is understandable, 
specific and relates to functionai 
abilities of people; (3) the exercise 
of guardians' powers within the 
constraints of the right to least 
restrictive setting, with no change 
made in a person's physical environ-
ment without a very specific showing 
of need to remove a person to a 
more restrictive setting; and (4) 
a system of limited guardianships 
in which rights are removed and 
supervision provided only for those 
activities in which the person has 
demonstrated an incapacity to act 
independently. 
(b) Public guardianship statutes should 
be reviewed for their effect in 
providing services to persons in 
need of but without guardianship. 
Utah, as well as other states who have adopted the 
Uniform Probate Code, has replaced the former informal and 
constitutionally questionable guardianship proceedings with 
substantive and procedural formalities that ensure procedural 
due process as outlined by the President's Commission. Utah 
Code Annotated, Sections 75-1-401, 75-5-309, and 75-5-405 require 
that personal notice be served 10 days prior to the hearing; 
-16-
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Section 75-5-303 ensures the individual's right to be present, 
to confront all witnesses, to present evidence, to counsel, to 
cross-examine witnesses, and to a jury; Section 75-5-307 ensures 
the right to petition for termination of incapacity; and Section 
75-1-308 ensures the right to appeal. The only procedural 
safeguard alleged by the appellant to be insufficient is the 
standard of proof. 
The Utah standard of proof goes to two issues -
whether the individual is incapacitated and whether the 
final appointment or order is necessary or desirable. 
The standard of proof required by the Utah Uniform 
Probate Code is that the court must be ''satisfied that the 
person for whom a guardian is sought is incapacitated and that 
the appointment is necessary or desirable .... " Section 75-5-304. 
The apparent problem with this standard is determining where it 
falls within the traditionally known standards of preponderance, 
clear and convincing, or beyond a reasonable doubt. However, 
the problem disappears for two reasons. 
First, as stated in Point II, guardianship is a vestige 
of the doctrine of parens patriae. Before the acute awareness 
and protection of due process and fundamental rights, the 
normal guardianship proceeding was informal and afforded few 
procedural safeguards. The justification of this was that the 
proceeding was to benefit the individual rather than to injure 
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him or deprive him of any rights. As the need to prevent the 
unnecessary deprivation of rights appropriately received 
measured concern, there was also recognized the need to pre-
serve the benefits of the informal proceeding. These benefits 
included efficiency, confidentiality, minimal advocacy that 
pr~vented additional trauma and alienation of the allegedly 
already troubled patient, and informality itself. As the court 
in Lake, supra, noted, the guardianship proceeding is still not 
a strictly adversary proceeding. Rather it is a proceeding to 
determine what action is in the best interest of the individual. 
The courts are permitted to choose the most reasonable alternative 
in light of what is necessary for the proper and effective care 
of the individual and is minimally restrictive of his rights. ~ 
A standard which traditionally pertains to and reflects the j 
adversarial nature seems in part inappropriate to a proceeding 
which is not strictly adversarial. For this reason a standard 
that recognizes the balance between the adversarial and bene-
f icial natures of the guardianship proceeding is most 
appropriate. The standard of "satisfaction" seems to reflect 
such balance. 
Second, to calm the fears of whimsy foreseen in the 
term "satisfied", Utah case law has given some substance to 
the word. The case of Abbott v. Peter, 105 Ut. 499, 143 P.2d 
606 (1943), which concerned the standard to prove mistake in 
contract, stated that the standard was equal to that necessary 
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to prove fraud, which was clear, convincing and satisfying. 
(See also Hobart v. Hobart, 26 Cal.2d 412, 159 P.2d 958 (1945)). 
It is clear from this court's discussion in Abbott, supra, 
that the word "satisfaction" is equated with the standard 
of clear and convincing evidence. "Satisfaction" requires 
more than a mere preponderance of the evidence or probability, 
and less than that required to prove a fact '~beyond a reasonable 
doubt." The clear and convincing standard is what is demanded 
by Appellant in the present case (See Point VI, Appellant's 
Brief) . 
It appears that the judge in the lower court may not 
have directed the jury in this case to apply the clear and 
convincing test. If this court determines that to be the 
required standard, the case might appropriately be reversed 
or remanded on that point. Such an action, however, would not 
necessitate a finding that the statute itself is invalid. 
Rather, the finding would be that the Utah statute requires 
clear and convincing proof and was simply erroneously inter-
preted or applied by the judge below. The State would suggest 
however, that the court carefully review the record in this 
matter, as it appears that the evidence produced was sufficient 
to meet even the more demanding test of clear and convincing 
proof. 
For a time there appeared to be some disagreement 
among authorities as to whether the standard of proof in 
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guardianship cases should be the more strict "beyond a 
reasonable doubt" standard. The case of In re Winship, 
397 U.S. 358 (1970) is cited by proponents of the stricter 
standard because the Supreme Court in that case applied the 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard in a juvenile case, which 
is considered a civil proceeding. However, the Winship 
court said that this was a "single narrow issue whether proof. 
beyond a reasonable doubt is among the 'essentials of due 
process ... ' during the adjudicatory stage when a juvenile 
is charged with an action which would constitute a crime if 
committed by an adult." 397 U.S. at 359. The case therefore 
is applicable only in the narrow context of criminal or quasi-
criminal proceedings. 
Other courts which applied the beyond a reasonable 
doubt standard to civil commitment proceedings were In re 
Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973); and Lessard v. Schmidt, 
349 F.Supp. 1978 (E.D. Wisc. 1972), vacated and remanded on 
other grounds, 414 U.S. 472 (1974). It should also be noted 
that Utah Code Annotated, Section 64-7-10, requires the beyond 
a reasonable doubt standard for involuntary commitments. 
However, in a unanimous decision, the United States 
Supreme Court held in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), 
that the standard of proof constitutionally required for civil 
commitment is clear and convincing evidence. The Addington 
case is controlling on this point and effectively overrules 
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Lessard, supra, and other earlier cases which purported to 
require a beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 
The discussion in French v. Blackburn, 428 F.Supp. 
1351 (M.D.N.C. 1977), affirmed 443 U.S. 901 (1979), is helpful 
in distinguishing the cases that urged the reasonable doubt 
standard. That court recognized that the sole purpose of the 
commitment proceeding was not deprivation of .liberty, but 
rather to aid and treat incapacitated individuals. The court 
also said that the issues in a commitment proceeding, by 
their very nature, are not .susceptible of proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt and that such a standard would be an 
impossible burden and prevent the aid to those in actual need. 
Id. at 1360. 
The 1978 President's Commission on Mental Health also 
recommended use of the clear and convincing standard as a 
sufficient due process safeguard. Mental Health and Human 
Rights, Arizona Law Review, 20:49-174, 76 1978. 
In view of recent case law and authority, the clear 
and convincing standard fully complies with due process 
requirements. Furthermore, in view of this authority and Utah 
statutes, the clear and convincing standard is also the most 
desirable since it recognizes the beneficial and protective 
nature of the proceedings, yet also protect the individual's 
rights to due process and equal protection. 
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Therefore, the Utah Uniform Probate Code does provide 
sufficient procedural formalities to protect the incapacitated 
person's right to procedural due process. Furthermore, the 
Utah standard of proof requiring the court to be satisfied 
that the person is incapacitated and that the guardianship 
appointment is necessary or desirable requires more than a 
mere preponderance of evidence but less than required by the 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. This "satisfaction" 
standard is equivalent to the clear and convincing standard 
which has been held by the United States Supreme Court to 
satisfy the requirements of due process. 
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POINT IV 
THE UTAH UNIFORM PROBATE CODE 
SUFFICIENTLY DEFINES "INCAPACITATED" 
SO AS TO GIVE ADEQUATE NOTICE TO THE 
COURT AND INDIVIDUAL. 
Finally, appellant argues that the Utah definition 
of "incapacitated" is vague and overbroad. Allegedly, the 
definition is so vague as to give no notice to the individual 
or the court as to what standard his conduct will be compared 
with to determine incapacity. 
The definition in question is found .in Section 75-
1-201(18), Utah Code Annotated, which provides as follows: 
"Incapacitated person" means any 
person who is impaired by reason of 
mental illness, mental deficiency, 
physical illness or disability, 
advanced age, chronic use of drugs, 
chronic intoxication, or other cause 
(except minority) to the extent that 
he lacks sufficient understanding or 
capacity to make or communicate 
responsible decisions concerning his 
person. 
First, the Utah standard of incapacity is not vague 
or overbroad. The Utah definition essentially is that an 
incapacitated person is any person who is impaired to the 
extent that he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity 
to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning his 
person, for whatever cause besides minority. The statute 
lists a number of causes, including mental illness and 
deficiency or any other. This list of causes seems to add 
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some insight into what the legislature foresaw as causing 
incapacity. However, this list obviously was not considered 
a meticulous and exclusive list of grounds for finding incapacity, 
since the focus of the statute is upon the resulting effect 
or impairment rather than upon the cause i~self. It is also 
difficult to understand how one could require the legislature 
to define in detail terms that even the mental health scienti~ts 
concede are not yet comprehensively definable. Symposium -
Mentally Retarded People and the Law, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 
31, p. 555, April, 1979. 
Second, the substantive and procedural statutes 
concerning involuntary guardianship add specificity to the 
definition of incapacity. The statutes as discussed above 
in Point III recognize the different causes and levels of 
incapacity and correspondingly create flexible procedures 
and altenatives so that the court might tailor the order 
or appointment to the needs of the individual while ensuring 
minimal infringement upon the exercise of his rights. The 
statutes are not overbroad because the courts are authorized 
to impose guardianship upon an individual only to the extent 
that the court is satisfied that the individual is incapacitated 
and that the appointment or order is necessary or desirable. 
Third, the Utah Uniform Probate Code defines in 
detail what are considered "responsible decisions concerning 
his person." Section 75-5-312,which outlines the general 
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powers and duties of the guardian, and Section 75-5-4, which 
outlines the duties of a conservator, obviously contain the 
lists of those decisions which the legislature intended as 
"responsible". These decisions include the protection of the 
person of the incapacitated, his abode, maintenance, education, 
training and health - and protection of the estate of the ward 
for the benefit of himself, his dependents, creditors, and the 
state. The Utah Uniform Probate Code permits the court to 
limit or expand the duties and powers of the guardian or to 
issue other appropriate orders in orde·r to allow the guardian 
to make only those decisions which the individual is incapable 
of making for himself. 
Fourth, the United States Supreme Court has held 
that a statute need not be mathematically precise. In the 
case of Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 108, 110 (1972), which 
addressed the allegation that a city anti-noise ordinance was 
too vague and broad, the court said, "[W]e can never expect 
mathematical certainty from our language. The words of the 
Rockford ordinance are marked by 'flexibility and reasonable 
breadth, rather than meticulous specificity'". As noted in 
this Point and Point I, the purpose of the Utah statute is 
to provide this necessary flexibility and breadth in order to 
comply with due process. 
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Finally, the individual is protected from any possible 
vagueness in definition by the requirement that the judge must 
be presented with clear and convincing evidence of the alleged 
incapacity (See Point III, supra). This is a demanding 
standard which is necessitated by the inherent inprecision of 
mental health definitions and determinations. Because of the 
standard of proof required by the statute, the ward is protected 
from haphazard or overbroad applications of the guardianship 
statute. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Utah Uniform Probate Code provides the necessary 
flexibility and procedural safeguards to ensure due process 
and equal protection of the laws during and following proceedings 
for the ap~ointment of a guardian. Therefore, the State of 
Utah, as amicus curiae, respectfully requests this court to 
uphold the guardianship statutes as constitutional. 
Dated this 4th day of June, 19 80. 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
SHARON PEACOCK 
Assistant Attorney General 
Amicus Curiae 
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